Order on Motions to Dismiss (KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC.) by Bonner, Alice D.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
9-17-2009
Order on Motions to Dismiss (KENNESAW
STATE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC.)
Alice D. Bonner
Superior Court of Fulton County
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Institutional Repository Citation
Bonner, Alice D., "Order on Motions to Dismiss (KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC.)" (2009). Georgia
Business Court Opinions. 86.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/86
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PLACE COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT,) 
LLC, CECIL M. PHILLIPS, and ) 
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION ) 
COMPANY, ) 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
MANHATTAN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Counter/Cross and 
Third Party-Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY 
FOUNDATION, INC., PLACE 
COLLEGIATE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
and CECIL M. PHILLIPS, 
Counter/Cross-Defendants, 
and 
CPO PLASTERING, INC., ST. PAUL 
FIRE AND MARINE INS. CO., TC 
DRYWALL AND PLASTER, INC., THE 
GUARANTEE CO. OF NORTH 
AMERICA USA, ATLANTA DRYWALL 
AND ACOUSTICS, INC., AMERICAN 
SOUTHERN INS. CO., METRO 
WATERPROOFING, INC. and 
WESTERN SURETY CO., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Civil Action File No. 2008 CV 156905 
FILED IN OFFICE' 
SEP 1 7 2009 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim of Defendant Manhattan Construction Company and on Defendant 
Manhattan Construction Company's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court 
has reviewed the briefs of the parties filed in connection with these motions and 
rules as follows: 
Background 
This case arises out of a dispute regarding the construction of dormitories 
at Kennesaw State University, and involves allegations of breach of contract and 
negligent construction. Plaintiff Kennesaw State University Foundation, Inc. 
("KSUF") entered into a contract with Defendant Place Collegiate Development, 
LLC ("Place") to develop and build student housing at the university. Place also 
entered into a contract with Manhattan Construction Company ("Manhattan") to 
build the dormitories. The contract between KSUF and Place assigns the 
warranties between Place and its subcontractors (including Manhattan) to KSUF. 
There were problems with the construction of the buildings which resulted in this 
lawsuit. The complaint alleges breach of contract, breach of implied warranty 
and negligent construction against Manhattan. Manhattan's counterclaim alleges 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment against KSUF. 
Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Manhattan does not oppose 
KSUF's motion to dismiss its counterclaim with regard to the claim for unjust 
enrichment, and so the Court does not consider the arguments made in support 
of the motion on that count of the counterclaim. 
KSUF argues that it is entitled to dismissal of Manhattan's contractual 
claims because there exists no privity between those parties. Manhattan argues 
that the assignment of its warranties by Place to KSUF at least creates a 
question offact as to the existence of a contract between it and KSUF. In its 
motion to dismiss Manhattan contends that Place's alleged initial material breach 
of its contract with Manhattan bars KSUF, as Place's assignee, from a claim of 
breach of contract against Manhattan. Alternatively, Place contends that the lack 
of privity between it and KSUF precludes an action for breach of contract and 
breach of implied warranty against it by KSUF. The central issue created by 
these arguments is the import and legal consequences of the assignment. 
With regard to its motion to dismiss the count for negligent construction, 
Manhattan argues that the only duty it owed was to Place, and thus it cannot be 
held liable for breach of duty to KSUF. Manhattan contends that the fact that its 
contract with Place was executed before the KSUF/Place contract was executed 
is proof that its only relationship in this construction venture was with Place and 
that it had no independent relationship with KSUF. 
Under Georgia law a subcontractor has no contractual relationship, no 
privity, with an owner with whom it has no contract. Hussey, Gay & Bell v. 
Georgia Ports Authority, 204 Ga. App. 504 (1992). Georgia law does allow 
parties to assign all or portions of their contractual rights to third parties. 
D.C.G.A. § 44-12-22. Manhattan does not allege that Place assigned its entire 
contract to KSUF, and does not dispute KSUF's contention that only the 
warranties were assigned. There is no evidence that KSUF intended to be 
bound by any of the contractual obligations of Place simply by accepting the 
assignment of Manhattan's warranties from Place. See High Point Sprinkler Co. 
of Atlanta v. George Hyman Construction Co., 164 Ga. App. 706 (1982). The 
Court concludes, therefore, that no privity and therefore no contractual 
obligations existed between KSUF and Manhattan. See Kennesaw Flooring, Inc. 
v. Rector, 291 Ga. App. 704 (2008). 
The Court is not persuaded by Manhattan's arguments that discovery is 
necessary for the development of evidence to support its contractual claims 
because there is no writing before the Court to show that KSUF assumed Place's 
obligations to Manhattan. On the contrary, the contract between KSUF and 
Place, which is before the Court is clear and unambiguous as to what contractual 
rights and obligations are assigned. That contract is thirty-one pages in length 
and covers the many facets of the contractual relationship between KSUF and 
Place. One provision of that contract assigns warranties given to Place by its 
subcontractors to KSUF as the owner of the property. Manhattan has not shown 
that KSUF expressly or impliedly assumed Place's obligations to Manhattan or 
that KSUF manifested any intention to be bound by Place's obligations. Central 
of Ga. R. Co. v. Woolfolk Chem. Works, Ltd, 122 Ga. App. 789 (1970). 
With regard to Manhattan's claim that Place's alleged initial material 
breach of its contract with Manhattan should be attributed to KSUF, the Court 
finds that it is unable to consider this argument in a motion to dismiss because it 
of necessity relies on extrinsic evidence, and not merely on the allegations in the 
complaint, and is thus not appropriate for a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). For the same reason, the Court cannot consider 
Manhattan's claim of res judicata without considering evidence, not before it, as 
to whether the defects KSUF complains of were litigated in prior arbitration 
between Manhattan and Place. 
Georgia law is clear that a negligent construction claim does not depend 
on privity of contract between the parties. '" [A] negligent construction claim 
arises not from a breach of contract claim but from the breach of a duty implied 
by law to perform the work in accordance with industry standards.''' Schofield 
Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Standard Building Co., 293 Ga. App. 812, 814 (2008). 
See also Stancliff v. Brown and Webb Builders, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 224 (2002). 
When the allegations in a complaint (or counterclaim) disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts, and when the movant establishes that the claimant could not 
possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint (or 
counterclaim) sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought, a dismissal should 
be granted. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498 (1997). 
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim of Defendant Manhattan Construction Company is hereby 
GRANTED, and Manhattan's motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this (1 day of September, 2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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